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TOPIC 11: THE AVAILABILITY AND
JUSTIFICATION OF PROPERTYBASED REMEDIES IN RESTITUTION
WHY IN RE OMEGAS GROUP WAS RIGHT: AN ESSAY ON
THE LEGAL STATUS OF EQUITABLE RIGHTS
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INTRODUCTION

The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment is, in my
view, an ideal Restatement. It faithfully reports the existing, mostly decisional,
law of restitution. It does not presume to remake the law from an academic
point of view; instead, its black letter provisions attempt to clarify, rationalize,
and incrementally improve the doctrine that has evolved in judicial decisions.
For the most part, it respects the value of legal rules: rather than referring
directly to the seductive but indeterminate idea of unjust enrichment, it
articulates relatively concrete rules of law.' It also provides a wealth of
examples to verify the rules it states.
Nevertheless, I believe that on one issue - the effect of constructive trusts in
insolvency - the Restatement (Third) should have engaged more aggressively
in law reform. In section 60, the Restatement (Third) takes the position that
2
constructive trust claimants have automatic priority over unsecured creditors.
The priority described in the Restatement (Third) works in this way: assume
Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
Professor John Dawson wrote that unjust

enrichment,

"formulated

as a

the peculiar faculty of inducing quite sober citizens to jump right off
the dock." JOHN P. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 8 (1951). For criticism of approaches to
generalization,..

. has

restitution that treat unjust enrichment as an open-ended source of decision-making
authority, see Emily Sherwin, Restitution and Equity, 79 TEx. L. REv. 2083, 2104-08, 2113
(2001).
2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 60(1) (2011).
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that B, an insolvent debtor, holds title to an asset, X 3 A establishes that B's
acquisition of X was an unjust enrichment of B at A's expense, as defined by
any of the substantive rules of unjust enrichment set out in the Restatement
(Third).4 At this point, A is entitled to a constructive trust against B.5 The
constructive-trust remedy treats A as the equitable owner of X - or, as the
Restatement (Third) puts it, declares that B's legal title is subject to A's
superior equitable right. 6 A bona fide purchaser of X from B prevails over A;
but unsecured creditors, or creditors holding judgment liens on property of the
debtor, do not qualify as bona fide purchasers. 7 It follows that A's restitution
claim to Xtakes priority over the claim of C, an ordinary creditor.8
Doctrine, as traditionally stated, supports this description. 9 In my view,
however, traditional doctrine rests on an overly literal application of the notion
of equitable title and a failure to appreciate the remedial nature of constructive
trusts. 10 If, as the Restatement (Third) assumes, 11 a constructive trust is a
vehicle for prevention of unjust enrichment, equitable title should be a
conclusion rather than a premise of the decision to impose a trust. In
presenting my arguments, I will detour into discussion of titles, equity, and the
distinction between right and remedy.
I.

CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS

A constructive trust is a very strong remedy for correction of unjust
enrichment. The remedy is historically equitable: it relies on the concept of
divided ownership that supports the law of express trusts and was first used to
capture gains by trustees who misappropriated trust property. 12 Over time, the
3 Id. § 60 cmt. b.
4Id.

I Id. § 55(1).
6 Id. § 55 cmt. b (stating that a constructive trust is "a declaration (i) that B's acquisition
of X leads to the unjust enrichment of B (or B's successors) at the expense of A, and
moreover (ii) that B acquired legal title to X subject to A's superior equitable claim").
7 Id. § 60(l); id. § 60 cmt. b.
8 Id. § 60(1).

9 See id. § 55; id. § 60 reporter's note cmt. b. But see infra notes 24-27 and
accompanying text (describing several contrary decisions in the bankruptcy courts).
10 I have written on this subject before. See Emily L. Sherwin, Constructive Trusts in
Bankruptcy, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 297 [hereinafter Sherwin, Constructive Trusts in
Bankruptcy]; Emily Sherwin, Unjust Enrichment and Creditors,27 REv. LITIG. 141 (2007)
[hereinafter Sherwin, Unjust Enrichment and Creditors]. In this Article, I will attempt to
clarify the logic of my position.
11 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55; id

§ 55

cmt. b ("A court has the power to reassign title . . . as a means of rectifying unjust
enrichment.").
12 On the history and operation of constructive trusts, see generally DAN B. DOBBS, LAW
OF REMEDIES 590 (2d ed. 1993), GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 9-20 (1978),

and James B. Ames, Following MisappropriatedProperty into Its Product, 19 HARv. L.
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courts expanded the constructive-trust remedy to cover a wide variety of
13
situations in which the legal title to property is deemed to be misplaced.
Equity courts also developed a companion remedy, the equitable lien, which
relies on a similar notion of divided title borrowed from the law of consensual
liens. 14 I will focus here on constructive trusts, although my analysis of
priority applies equally to equitable liens.
A constructive trust treats the recipient of title as if he or she were a true
trustee, holding legal title for the benefit of the restitution claimant. 5 The
fictitious trust relationship relates back to the time of the initial transfer, so that
any profits the trustee may have realized in the interim also belong to the
claimant. 16 Once the parties' rights have been adjudicated, however, the trust
is simply a vehicle for reassignment of title: the sole duty of the constructive
trustee is to convey legal title immediately to the claimant. 17 The primary
objective of the remedy is to provide a powerful deterrent against wrongful
8
acquisition of property by removing any potential profit from the transaction.'
To qualify for a constructive trust, the claimant must establish a substantive
claim of unjust enrichment, show that the enrichment took the form of title to a
specific asset, and trace the asset, or proceeds received in exchange for the
asset, to property currently owned by the defendant. 19 For a claimant who
meets these requirements, the constructive-trust remedy has significant
20 It
advantages over an ordinary claim to restitution measured in money.
allows the claimant to recover specific property and thus avoids the need to
prove the monetary value of the enrichment; it captures any appreciation in the
value of the property; and as noted, it elevates the trust claimant to a position

REv. 511, 513-14 (1905).
13 PALMER, supra note 12, at 12.
14Rather than awarding a particular asset to the claimant, an equitable lien gives the
claimant a lien on the asset in the amount of his or her money claim to restitution. See id. at
20.
15 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55 cmt. b.
16 See id. § 55 cmt. e (suggesting that a constructive trust recognizes property interests
that come into existence at the time of the enrichment, and its effect relates back to that
time); 5 AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 462.4, at 322-

324 (4th ed. 1989) (suggesting that constructive trusts arise at the time of enrichment).
17 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 5 5(2).

18 See PALMER, supranote 12, at 180. Equitable liens are useful in unwinding mistaken
transfers or unenforceable bargains that involve no wrongdoing but produce results that are
unfair and possibly inefficient. SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 16, § 463, at 332.
19 The asset may be the thing originally acquired or the product of one or more exchange
transactions; the defendant may be the original recipient, a donee from the recipient, or a
purchaser with notice of the unjust enrichment. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION
AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 58-59 (discussing tracing); Ames, supranote 12, at 516.
20 Sherwin, Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy, supra note 10, at 304.
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of priority over ordinary creditors who have not bargained for a lien on the
21
assets claimed.
In XL/Datacomp, Inc. v. Wilson (In re Omegas Group), the Sixth Circuit

rejected this last incident of the constructive trust remedy in federal bankruptcy
proceedings. 22 The court reasoned that a constructive trust is simply a judicial
remedy, which takes effect when awarded by a court; therefore, under state
law, the claimant has no equitable ownership interest before the entry of a
decree. 23 It also indicated that, whatever position state courts might take about
the time when the claimant's interest accrues, bankruptcy policies favoring
proportional division of assets override the claim of priority: "The equities of
bankruptcy are not the equities of the common law. Constructive trusts are
anathema to the equities of bankruptcy since they take from the estate, and thus
24
directly from competing creditors, not from the offending debtor.
Accordingly, the court held that a claimant who has not obtained a state court
decree imposing a constructive trust on particular assets before the filing of a
bankruptcy petition cannot remove those assets from the pool available to
creditors. 25 As a precedent, In re Omegas Group has its difficulties: the
constructive trust claim was weak, 26 and the Sixth Circuit appears to have

backpedaled in a later decision. 27 Yet it raises significant questions about a
common bankruptcy maneuver that takes advantage of a traditional, but
arguably misguided, piece of restitution doctrine.
II. PRIORITY AND EQUITABLE TITLE
The formal explanation of priority for constructive trust claimants over
unsecured creditors rests on the premise that the constructive trust claimant has

21 Id. at 304-06. Section 66 of the Restatement (Third) defines "purchase" as including
consensual secured loans. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 66 cmt. c.
22 16 F.3d 1443 (6th Cir. 1994); see also Torres v. Eastlick (In re N. Am. Coin &
Currency, Ltd.), 767 F.2d 1573, 1576 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding no "actual fraud" to support a
constructive trust claim when a constructive trust would give priority to customers who
could trace their claims to a fund over customers who could not), amended by 774 F.2d
1390 (9th Cir. 1985).
23 In re Omegas Grp., 16 F.3d at 1449-50.
24 Id. at 1452.

25 Id. at 1451.

26 Datacomp, Inc. was engaged in a rather shady venture with Omegas Group, Inc.,
involving resale of customized IBM computers. Id. at 1445. Datacomp's constructive-trust
claim was based on Omegas Group's breach of a supposed duty to disclose its inability to
perform its part in the venture. See id. at 1445-46.
27 See Newpower v. Boyd, 233 F.2d 922, 934 (6th Cir. 2000) (lifting the Bankruptcy
Code's automatic stay to permit an embezzlement victim to press a constructive trust claim
in state court). For reasons not germane to this Article, it is difficult to tell how much of In
re Omegas Group remains in force after this decision.
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a property interest in the assets subject to the claim. 28 A's claim of unjust
enrichment against 29B gives A an interest in X, variously described as an
"equitable interest," a "superior equitable claim, ' '30 or simply an "equity" 31 the terms are equivalent in effect. 32 C has no property interest in X and has not
given value to B in exchange for a transfer of X.3 3 Therefore, A's equitable
interest in X prevails over C's claim to be paid from proceeds of X. 34
Moreover, the result is just because C ought not be paid from property
35
belonging to X.
A's interest in X, however, is not an ordinary property right; at best, it is a
very soft form of ownership. As an initial point, I assume that title to property
is a sensible legal concept: it denotes legal ownership of a thing. 36 The thing
owned may be a physical object, defined by its physical properties; or it may
be a legal thing (such as a share of stock), defined by a set of rules that are
sufficiently determinate to settle most disputes over what is owned. 37
Ownership of the thing normally depends on similarly determinate rules that
assign title of title to a person or entity; ownership, for example, might be
established by a deed, record of purchase, or a fixed period of active
possession. 38 These two features of property rights - definite rules governing
what can be owned and definite rules governing who owns them - are the
minimum components of property rights that are capable of operating in rem
and supporting transactions between owners and the rest of the world.39
28 RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

§ 55

cmt. d (2011).

Id.
30 Id.§ 55 cmt. b.
29

"1Id. § 55 cmt. g.
32 Id. § 55 cmt. b.
13 Id. § 55 cmt. d.
34 Id.; id § 60 cmt. a & b.
35 Id.§ 55 cmt. d ("[A] debtor should not be allowed to rob Peter to pay Paul.").
36 My understanding of property rights, outlined briefly in the text, is described in more
detail in Emily Sherwin, Three Reasons Why Even Good Property Rights Cause Moral
Anxiety, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1927 (2007) [hereinafter Sherwin, Three Reasons], and
Emily Sherwin, Two- and Three-Dimensional Property Rights, 29 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1075
(1997) [hereinafter Sherwin, Property Rights].
37 Sherwin, Three Reasons, supra note 36, at 1930.
38 Sherwin, Property Rights, supra note 36, at 1076.
39See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 24-58 (2000); Thomas W.
Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happenedto Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE

L.J. 357, 385-97 (2001) (discussing the in rem nature of property rights); see also WESLEY
NEWCOMB

HOHFELD,

FUNDAMENTAL

LEGAL

CONCEPTIONS

AS

APPLIED

IN

JUDICIAL

REASONING 72 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919) (describing property rights as "multitle"
rights, or legal relations operating in rem against a large or indefinite number of people).

What the designated owner can do with the designated thing is a separate question, which
I will not take up here.

GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PENALVER, AN
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Without them, there is no line demarcating property from any other category of
40
legal rights and duties.
Within the understanding of property rights just described, equitable title is
also a sensible, though limited, legal concept. A beneficiary's interest in an
express trust is a common example of a genuine equitable title. 4 1 Both the
thing equitably owned and its owner are defined by determinate rules. 42 The
thing is a set of rights against the trustee, typically embodied in a document
and supplemented by a long line of decisions on the content and enforcement
of fiduciary duties. 43 Most often, beneficiaries are named explicitly in the
document or transaction establishing the trust. 44 The title is equitable because
it originally was enforced only in equity. 45 It coexists with the trustee's legal
title and, consequently, is not fully effective against third parties: if the trustee
transfers legal title to a bona fide purchaser, the beneficiary's interest in the
specific asset transferred comes to an end.46 Yet, by the criteria set out above,
the beneficiary's interest qualifies as a form of title to property: questions
about who owns what can be answered readily in advance of a dispute, by
reference to settled and fairly objective rules.
A constructive trust draws on the same idea of divided ownership to provide
a remedy against unjust enrichment. 47 B has legal title, but the imposition of a
constructive trust makes B's title a bare legal title with the equitable interest
belonging to A.48 The source of this equitable interest, however, is not a
formal transaction undertaken for the purpose of creating a well-known form
of equitable right, but any one of a wide variety of situations that may be
characterized as unjust enrichment: a fraud, a mistake, or something more
INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY THEORY (forthcoming 2012); see Sherwin, Property Rights,
supranote 36, at 1092-1102.
49. For examples of property theory that reject the possibility of determinate doctrinal
rules, see Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegrationof Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII 69
(J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1987), and Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the
Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 61 (1964) ("Property is the end result of a process of
competition among inconsistent and contending economic values ....
[It is] the value
which each owner has left after the inconsistencies between... two competing owners have
been resolved.").
41 1 AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 2.7, at 49 (4th ed.

1987).
42 Id. at 48.

43 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 reporter's note cmt. 15(2007); ScOr &
FRATCHER, supra note 41, § 2.7, at 48-49.
4 Traditionally, the validity of a trust depends on the existence of at least one
ascertainable beneficiary, capable of enforcing the duties of the trustee. See, e.g., Nichols v.
Allen, 130 Mass. 211,212 (1881).
45 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 41, § 2.7, at 49.
46 ScoTT & FRATCHER, supra note 16, § 470, at 363.
47 Id. at 310-11.
48 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55 cmt. a (2011).
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subtle such as violation of an implied understanding between unmarried
49
cohabitants.
The Restatement (Third) takes the position that in all such cases, if A, the
claimant, can point to specific assets representing unjust enrichment, A has a
form of ownership from the time of the enrichment, with or without the50
intervention of a court and subject only to the rights of a bona fide purchaser.
The reason given is that the law of unjust enrichment (that is, the law of fraud,
the law of mistake, or the law of implied understandings between cohabitants)
limits the effect of the transfer from A to B.51 Because the transfer is
incomplete, B's title is nominal from the outset, and A never parts with
equitable ownership. 52 The effect of a constructive-trust remedy is simply to
recognize this state of affairs. 53 Nothing changes with the entry of the decree,
except that A can now invoke the machinery associated with enforcement of
54
judicial decisions to reconcile the legal and equitable ownership.
From these assumptions about the property rights of A and B, the conclusion
that A has priority over C follows as a matter of course: C, as B's creditor, can
reach only the nominal title belonging to B.5 5 The explanation the Restatement
(Third) provides - that A's transfer to B is defective, leaving A with residual
equitable ownership - allows the Restatement (Third) to add the more

substantive
allowed to
insolvency,
A and B's

assertion that B's creditors will be unjustly enriched if they are
share in X, the asset identified to A's claim. 56 In a situation of
when the contest over X is no longer between, A and B but between
creditors, the relevant enrichment is not enrichment of B, but

enrichment of B's creditors.57 Given the Restatement (Third)'s view of A's

rights, however, this does not present a problem: A is and always has been the
real owner of X; therefore using X to pay C is an unjust enrichment of C at A's
58
expense.
49 ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note 16, § 462.1, at 311.
50 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55 cmt. a.

51 See id. § 55 cmt. b ("The trust metaphor persists because it conveys ... the central
feature of the remedy in every setting: namely, the determination by the court that B's legal
title to particular property must yield to A's superior (and equitable) right of ownership.").
52 See id.
53 See Scorr & FRATCHER, supra note 16, § 462.4, at 323.
14

See id.

55 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

§ 55 cmt. d
("Because B's general creditors are not bona fide purchasers, their rights in X ... cannot
exceed B's interest: namely, the 'voidable' or 'bare legal' title that is subject to A's rights in
restitution."). Comments to section 60 add that A's property right in X must be superior to
C's rights, because an unsecured creditor such as C has no right to any specific asset. Id.
§ 60 cmt. b.
56 See id
57 Id. § 55 cmt. c.
58 Id. § 55 cmt d; id. § 55 reporter's note cmt. d ("[Tihe attempt to enforce a constructive
trust in a three-party context resolves itself into (and ultimately depends upon) the
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The Restatement (Third)'s position on priority can be stated more formally
as follows:
1. A's transfer to B is defective.
2. Therefore B's title is nominal and A retains equitable ownership ofX.
3. A constructive trust is a remedy based on unjust enrichment.
4. In case of B's insolvency, A is entitled to a constructive trust if C would
be unjustly enriched by sharing in X.
5. C has no interest in X and has not given value to B in reliance on B's title
to X.
6. Because A is the equitable owner of X and C has no interest in X and has
not given value to B in reliance on B's title to X, payment of any portion of
Xto C will enrich C unjustly at A's expense.
7. Therefore, priority of A over C in the distribution of X is necessary to
avoid unjust enrichment of C at A's expense.
The key assumption in this argument is, of course, the second assumption,
that A retains equitable ownership after a defective transfer. The alternative
view I will defend holds that divided ownership is not a background legal fact
recognized by the declaration of a constructive trust, but a remedial conclusion
settling a dispute about unjust enrichment. A has a restitution claim from the
time of the initial enrichment, but this claim does not share the typical - and, in
my view, necessary - features of a property right. A has transferred legal title
to B, in compliance with the formal rules of property law that assign assets
such as X to an owner. There has been no intentional division of legal and
equitable ownership by recognized procedures in the manner of an express
trust. 5 9 The transfer from A to B is defective in some way, but the defect is not
a breach of conventions for transfer of ownership; it is the presence of some set
of circumstances in which courts have recognized unjust enrichment. Some of
these circumstances, such as a mistaken payment, fall into well-defined
categories. But others, such as benefits conferred on a cohabitant on the
unstated condition that cohabitation will continue, are highly dependent on
background facts. 60 When A is B's domestic partner, it is very hard to say,
with the certainty associated with property rights, that A retains a residual
property interest in an item of value A bestows on B.6 1 An entitlement that
contention that the debtor's general creditors stand to be unjustly enriched at the expense of
the restitution claimant.").
59 ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note 41, § 2.7, at 48-49.
60 As elaborated in the Restatement (Third), unjust enrichment is not an amorphous
moral notion, but a term of art developed over time by the courts. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §

1 cmt. b (rejecting the equation of

unjust enrichment with natural justice). Nevertheless, the doctrine of unjust enrichment is
diverse and largely fact-specific.
61 See id. § 28 cmt. c (acknowledging that "[b]ecause a conclusion about unjust
enrichment is potentially influenced by all of the circumstances both of the parties'
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takes its content from this substantive background is not ownership as I
understand it: what A has, from the time of enrichment, is a legal argument that
someone else's enjoyment of Xis an unjust enrichment at A's expense.
It may be tempting to say that A's claim is a claim of ownership because A
has identified a thing, X, that represents the claim. This argument is
misleading for several reasons. First, the asset A transferred to B may not be
the same X that A and B's creditors are fighting over at the time of the decree.
X can be the product or proceeds of the original thing, as long as A can link the
original to X through a process of exchange. 62 Second, exchange tracing is
causally arbitrary: B might just as well have sold what he received from A and
exchanged or retained something else. 63 Thus, although A's identification of a
particular asset as the subject of his claim is a fact to consider in assessing
unjust enrichment at the remedial stage, it does not establish that A owns the
asset.
These different assumptions about the nature of A's right to X help to
explain the difference between my own view of priorities in insolvency and the
view expressed in the Restatement (Third). If, as I have argued, A has no
property right from the time of enrichment, a constructive trust is not a
declaration of pre-existing rights but a remedy that protects A if and only if A
can make a case of unjust enrichment in the circumstances of the dispute. In a
bankruptcy proceeding, the circumstances of the dispute include the fact that
B's creditors, rather than B, are the parties who stand to benefit if the court
denies priority to A, and the question is whether allowing C to share is an
unjust enrichment of C at A's expense. The argument for A cannot assume its
own conclusion: A must argue, without relying on equitable ownership, that the
nature of the transfer gives A a superior claim against X.
If this view is correct, the formal argument for priority must be modified as
follows:
1. A's transfer to B is defective.
2. As against B, A is entitled to a constructive trust declaring that B's title is
nominal and A retains equitable ownership of X.
3. A constructive trust is a remedy based on unjust enrichment.
4. In case of B's insolvency, A is entitled to a constructive trust if C would
be unjustly enriched by sharing in X.

cohabitation and of its termination, outcomes cannot be safely predicted apart from the facts
of a particular case").
62 Id. § 58; id. § 58 cmt. a.
63 See Dale A. Oesterle, Deficiencies of the Restitutionary Right to Trace
MisappropriatedProperty in Equity and in UCC § 9-36, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 172, 190
(1982). The Restatement (Third) defends exchange tracing as "a rough proxy test... for the

direct inquiry into but-for causation."

RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST

ENRICHMENT § 58 cmt b; see also id. § 59 (describing the even more causally arbitrary rules
for tracing into and out of commingled funds).
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5. C has no interest in Xand has not given value to B in reliance on B's title
to X.
6. Because A is the equitable owner of X and C has no interest in X and has
not given value to B in reliance on B's title to X, payment of any portion of
Xto C will enrich C unjustly at A's expense.
7. Therefore, priority of A over C in the distribution of X is necessary to
avoid unjust enrichment of C at A's expense.
Adjusted in this way, the argument is no longer valid. if, as stated in (2),
equitable title is the consequence of a constructive trust rather than a premise
on which the constructive trust is based, then equitable title cannot be the basis
for a conclusion of unjust enrichment.
Thus, on my understanding of A's rights, equitable title enters the picture
only at the remedial stage. If A can establish that creditors will be enriched by
sharing in X, then the constructive-trust remedy assigns equitable ownership to
A. Typically, the decree will provide, or doctrine governing constructive trusts
will imply, that A's title relates back to the time of the initial transfer and is
effective from that date against all but a bona fide purchaser for value. 64 But
the pre-dated trust is only a remedial device by which the court confers priority
on A to prevent unjust enrichment. 65 The source of A's title is state law, but
the applicable state law is the state's law of unjust enrichment and remedies for
unjust enrichment, not the state's law of property.
III. THE CASE FOR REMEDIAL PRIORITY
Ultimately, therefore, questions about the relative priority of constructivetrust claimants and unsecured creditors depend on competing assumptions
about property rights. The Restatement (Third) treats priority as the
consequence of a property right that arises directly from the law of unjust
enrichment. 66 According to the alternative I have outlined, the law of unjust
enrichment supports a remedy that confers priority as the solution to particular
disputes. 67 For simplicity, I will refer to the priority described in the
Restatement (Third) as entitlement-based priority and to the alternative as
remedial priority.
The principal advantage of remedial priority is that it promotes a cleaner and
more effective conception of property rights. The notion of title is not clouded
by "equities" that have property-like consequences but lack the determinacy

I See id. § 55 cmt. e.
65 See id. § 55 cmt. b.
66 Id. § 60 cmt. a.
67 The remedy takes the form of a "property rule" in the terminology proposed by Judge
Calabresi and Mr. Melamed. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089,
1094 (1972). The underlying entitlement, however, is not what I would call a property

right.
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that enables property rights to support transactions and operate in rem; instead,
property ownership is confined to standardized and fairly well-defined
situations. Unavoidably, there are ambiguities in the rules governing title; and
even when title is clear, ownership is subject to a wide variety of restrictions
and obligations that create uncertainty about the value of the thing owned. In
general, however, courts attempt to maintain clarity about who owns what. In
contrast, the law of restitution relies on relatively indeterminate standards of
reasonableness and fair dealing. 68 Standards of this kind are appropriate for
judging the strength of a claim based on unjust enrichment, but when used as
criteria for assignment of title, they greatly complicate the locus of ownership.
A remedial approach to priority for constructive trust claimants is also
consistent with the supposition that constructive trusts are grounded in and
dependent on the principle of unjust enrichment. To repeat the key point:
when B, the original recipient, is insolvent, granting or denying priority to A no
longer affects B; the parties potentially enriched are B's creditors. This is an
important change, because there are significant differences between B and B's
creditor C. B is a liar, a cheat, a thief, or an advantage taker, whose behavior
in the transaction with A should be deterred by eliminating potential profit.
Presumably, C is not a liar, cheat, or thief, at least in the pertinent transaction.
At most, C has assumed the risk of B's default, by giving value on the strength
of B's unsecured promise to pay. If C is a tort creditor, C has taken only the
risks inherent in interacting with other human beings. If C is asserting an
unjust enrichment claim similar to A's claim against B, the only difference
between A and C is that A has, perhaps fortuitously, identified specific
products of the property A transferred to B.
In most cases, A, too, has taken risks in transacting with B. A hired a
potential embezzler, made a careless mistake, believed a liar, fell for a scheme
too good to be true, or put blind faith in a domestic partner who resisted
marriage. Some of these acts are less foolish than lending money on credit;
some are not. If we shift from personal comparisons to social policy, the
outcome is similarly debatable and sensitive to context: we want to protect
innocents who make mistakes or act from misplaced trust and to ensure that
transfers are voluntary; but we also want to encourage credit and secure
compensation for victims of wrongs.
Ideally, a full assessment of unjust enrichment should take all of these
considerations into account, as they apply to the parties who actually stand to
gain or lose by the imposition of a constructive trust. In other words, a court
deciding A's constructive trust claim should compare the positions of A and C,
in all their complexity. Alternatively, in a proceeding involving multiple
creditors, the court might compare A's position with that of a typical creditor,
such as a business creditor who gave value to B in exchange for B's promise to
pay an agreed price.

68

See, e.g.,

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt.
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Remedial priority is also consistent with the special priority rule set out in
section 61 of the Restatement (Third). Section 61 limits the priority of
constructive-trust claimants over creditors to the amount the constructive
claimant lost in his or her transaction with the debtor, thus excluding
appreciation or gains from exchange. 69 If X is worth more than A lost in
70
dealing with B, A's priority over C is limited to the amount of A's loss.
When the Restatement (Third) qualifies priority in this way, it places an
important qualification on the notion of equitable ownership: the transfer from
A to B is no less defective, but A's equitable ownership is limited because
treating A as an owner would result in enrichment of A at the expense of C.
Remedial priority, therefore, is more conducive to a well-defined legal notion
of ownership, and more faithful to the objective of preventing unjust
enrichment, than the entitlement-based priority endorsed in the Restatement
(Third). Yet, it has disadvantages as well, which ultimately may justify a
simpler approach. One of these disadvantages is theoretical: the arguments
offered above for remedial priority rely on distinctions between concepts that
may in fact differ only in degree. Title to property (what B has) stands in
contrast to a claim against property (what A has), although the difference
between the two is only a difference in the relative determinacy of governing
rules. Rights (such as A's right to relief based on unjust enrichment) stand in
contrast to remedies (such as the constructive trust A requests) - a common
distinction but one that also reduces to a question of degree.7 1 Remedies can
be described as an aspect of rights: to have a right against unjust enrichment at
one's expense is to have access to a set of legal remedies if certain conditions
are met. The difference between a right, so described, and a remedy is only a
difference in the extent to which courts tailor their conclusions to the particular
circumstances of the parties to a dispute. Theoretical difficulties of this kind,
however, are not of great concern. The concepts of right and remedy, title and
claim, determinate and indeterminate are sustainable for the same reasons that
69

See id. § 6 1(a) ("[T]he portion of the restitution claim exceeding the claimant's loss is

subordinated to the claims of the recipient's creditors ... .
70 Id. § 61 cmt. b.
7 This distinction is built into the language of law and has practical legal consequences.
An example is the special set of rules on modification of injunctions, which rest on the
assumption that injunctions are remedies rather than rights. See, e.g., Ladner v. Siegel, 148
A. 699, 701 (Pa. 1930) ("While the decree ... is an adjudication of the facts..., it is none
the less executory and continuing as to the purpose or object to be attained .... ). Consider
also Producers Lumber & Supply Co. v. Olney Building Co., 333 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1960), in which a mistaken improver who took back the improvement by self-help was
liable to the landowner for damages, although state precedents authorized an equitable
remedy allowing mistaken improvers to reclaim their improvements. Id. at 626 (Barrow, J.,
dissenting) ("Regardless of what the law may be in other jurisdictions, it is well settled in
this State, that a person who has in good faith made improvements upon the land of another
may obtain relief either in a suit in trespass to try title in an independent action for the
purpose, or in defense of a suitfor removing the improvement.").
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it is possible to call a person bald without specifying the exact -number of
72
missing hairs that makes the statement true.
The more worrisome problem is practicability: Can courts sensibly judge, in
the case of each A who may come before them, whether creditors will be
unjustly enriched by sharing in X? An inquiry of this kind is not only complex
but unguided.
Most precedents on the question of priority between
constructive-trust claimants and creditors of the constructive trustee simply
assume equitable ownership, in the manner of the Restatement (Third), and
hold for the claimant. 73 Consequently, a court willing to embark on a full
remedial assessment of unjust enrichment in insolvency has no point of
reference other than the principle of unjust enrichment itself. This is not a
satisfactory state of affairs - unjust enrichment is far too vague an idea to
impose discipline on adjudication. 74 Over time, courts might develop more
concrete rules governing the comparative strength of various classes of
restitution claims in relation to creditors: claims based on embezzlement or
believable misrepresentation or minimally careless mistake might prevail over
creditors; claims more easily amenable to self-protection might not. 75 But no
such rules exist at present.
CONCLUSION:

No PRIORITY

Assuming that case-by-case assessment of the relative strength of claims to
X by A and C is not practicable, and in the absence of a set of rules mapping
out a middle ground, the only viable option is a simple rule in one direction or
another. The choice, in other words, is between the Restatement (Third)'s rule
of automatic priority for constructive-trust claimants and the Sixth Circuit's
rule eliminating constructive trust priority in cases of insolvency.76 Averaging
across possible contexts (different types of constructive-trust claimants and
different types of creditors), the choice between these rules is not obvious.
Tradition favors the Restatement (Third), but the applicable tradition was
72 For

discussion of Sorites Paradox, see Dominic Hyde, Sorites Paradox, STANFORD
OF PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sorites-paradox/
(last
updated Dec. 6, 2011).
73 A possible exception is Torres v. Eastlick (In re North American Coin & Currency,
Ltd.), 767 F.2d 1573 (9th Cir. 1985), amended by 774 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1985), where the
court denied a constructive trust and commented, "A constructive trust is not the same kind
of interest in property as a joint tenancy or a remainder. It is a remedy, flexibly fashioned in
equity to provide relief where a balancing of interests in the context of a particular case
seems to call for it." Id. at 1575.
14 I have made this argument at length elsewhere. Sherwin, supra note 1, at 2084.
75 For a mainly unsuccessful attempt to formulate rules of this kind, see Sherwin,
Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy, supra note 10, at 340-61.
76 Under the analysis presented here, the rule adopted in XL/Datacomp, Inc. v. Wilson (In
re Omegas Grp.), 16 F.3d 1443, 1451 (6th Cir. 1994), would not be applied as a rule of
federal bankruptcy law but would be duly recast as a feature of the state law of constructive
trusts.
ENCYCLOPEDIA
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shaped by a remedial fiction and has never been fully articulated in terms of
unjust enrichment. The no-priority option, although no more or less true to the
principle of unjust enrichment, promotes equality in the division of scarce
assets in insolvency. It also has the important advantage of avoiding a softproperty notion of equitable title. In my view, the benefits of clarity about
property ownership should carry the day: in the context of insolvency,
constructive-trust claimants are just a species of creditors, with no special
"equity" on their side.
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